Aiming at the new problem of price competition between three echelon supply chains, this paper quantitatively analyzes the reasons for the low price competition under the ten decision-making forms under the framework of the Bertrand game, and then one of the supply chains is differentiated by providing value-added services, thus reducing the impact of price competition on them. It also deduces whether the critical point of differential investment is to be differentiated, and compares the value increment of the ten decision forms. The conclusion is: when the product differentiation is the same, the value of the supply chain of value-added services depends on the decision form of the other chain, and the decentralized decision making is the best form of decision. In particular, when the degree of alienation is relatively large, the difference between the value of three differentiated investment critical points is 2 times.
Introduction
Since the reform and opening up, China's economy has developed rapidly, and all walks of life have shown a prosperous scene under the market economy.
From the perspective of China's market structure, products in many industries have shown the characteristics of monopolistic competition and oligopoly.
Along with the emergence of oligopolistic enterprises, the phenomenon of "price war" has also appeared widely. For this reason, enterprises adopt differentiated strategies to carry out production and operation to ensure the sustainable and stable development of enterprises. Lu Wenlong [1] and others applied the Hotel-American Journal of Industrial and Business Management 
The first stage: Two supplier companies determine their respective supply prices by maximizing their profit function. Similarly, by substituting the equilibrium solution of the wholesale price into the profit function (c 1 ) of the two supplier companies, you can get:
Solve the equilibrium solution that the supplier sells to the manufacturer based on (4 1 ) and profit maximization condition Case 2: The profit function of the supply chain system under the (1, 2) decision can be expressed as: 
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Proof: The third stage: Proof of the same theorem.
The second stage: The manufacturer of supply chain one aims to maximize its profit function, while the supply chain 2 aims to maximize the overall profit of suppliers and manufacturers, and determine the wholesale price of the two supply chains. Substituting the equilibrium solution of the retail price into A, B, two profit functions are available: 
According to the profit function (1) 2 , (2) 2 and the maximum profit condition 
The first stage: The supplier of supply chain one determines the pricing sold to the manufacturer by maximizing its profit function. Similarly, the profit function of the supplier that substitutes the equilibrium solution of the wholesale price into the supply chain one can be obtained:
, solve the equilibrium solution that the supplier sells to the manufacturer's pricing: 
1,3
Theorem 3: Under the (1, 3) combination, the retail price equilibrium solutions of the two supply chains are: 0, 0
, the equilibrium solution of the retail price of the two supply chain products is solved:
The second stage: The manufacturer of supply chain one determines the wholesale price by maximizing its profit function. Substituting the equilibrium solution of the retail price into A can be obtained:
According to the profit function (3) 3 and the maximum profit condition
, the equilibrium solution expression of the wholesale price of the supply chain can be solved:
Phase 1: Two-supplier companies determine the pricing they sell to manufacturers by maximizing their profit function. Similarly, the equilibrium solution of the wholesale price is substituted into the profit function A, B of the two supplier companies, which can be obtained: 
According to the profit function (5) 3 , (6) 3 of the supplier company and the profit maximization condition 1   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  2  1,3   2  2  2  2  2   4  2 2  2  2 2  2  2  2 2  2 4  2 
Substituting (7) 3 and (8) 3 into (4) 3 and substituting into (1) 3 , (2) 3 , and solving the equilibrium solution of the available retail price, the theorem is proved.
Scenario 4: Under the (1, 4) combination, the equilibrium solutions of the two supply chain retail prices are: 
Scenario 7: Under the (2, 4) combination, the equilibrium solutions of the two supply chain retail prices are:
Scenario 8: Under the (3, 3) combination, the equilibrium solutions of the two supply chain retail prices are:
Scenario 9: Under the (3, 4) combination, the equilibrium solutions of the two supply chain retail prices are: price of the supply chain is close to the marginal cost, and the profit of the enterprise approaches zero. This is called "Bertrand Paradox".
The conclusion of the two three-level supply chain Bertrand equilibrium is that if the product differentiation of the two-chain production is small, close to 0.8, then no supply chain can control the market price and obtain excess profits.
Differentiated Models for Providing Value-Added Services
In order to improve the phenomenon of low-price competition in the supply chain, it is necessary to expand the differentiation of products between the two supply chains. The following mainly studies the supply chain by providing value-added services to differentiate. This paper assumes that product differentiation behavior in the supply chain refers to the cost of retailers in the supply chain to pay a certain value-added service. Assume that only the supply chain provides value-added services for product differentiation, S ∆ represents the unit cost of the supply chain to provide value-added services, v ∆ is a new service value of the supply chain, and after adding new variables, the supply chain is a retailer [8] . The profit function, supply chain one and supply chain two demand function are expressed as follows:
Then the demand function of supply chain 1 and supply chain 2 becomes:
( ) The profit function of a retail chain-retailer becomes:
( )
The following theorem gives the Bertrand game between two supply chains, the supply chain one provides product differentiation services, and the retail price changes of ten decision models.
Theorem 4.1: After the supply chain provides value-added services, the changes in retail prices are: Explain that the supply chain has increased the differentiation of products by providing value-added services, and increased the price of its own products, and when the decision forms of the two supply chains are (2, 2) and (3, 3) respectively, the supply chain one. The retail price increments are equal. When the decision forms of the two supply chains are (2, 4) and (3, 4) , the retail price increments of supply chain one are also equal. 
e represents the first supply chain to choose the 1, 2,3, 4 i = combination form, and the second supply chain chooses the 1, 2,3, 4 j = combination form. e , "2 = 3" means
e , because the calculated
e approximation is equal to
e , so the line 2 is basically coincided with the line 3, and "4" means
e . Theorem 4.3: It can be seen from figure that when the degree of differentiation is constant, the efficiency of differentiation under each decision form has the following relationship:
When the decision mode between supply chains is (1, 1), the relationship
e e * = can be obtained; When the supply chain decision mode is (1, 3), (2, 3) , the relationship
e e e * = = can be obtained; When the supply chain decision mode is (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 3) , the relationship
e e e e * = = = can be obtained; And when the degree of differentiation is small ( )
e e * * = can be obtained; When the supply chain decision mode is (1, 4), (2, 4) , (3, 4) , (4, 4) , the relationship e e e e e * = = = = can be obtained. Analysis: Using the positive and negative of the difference in the efficiency of the investment efficiency in the above-mentioned properties, it is possible to judge whether or not to conduct differentiated investment behavior. When two supply chains select one of the ten decision-making forms, when the differentiation efficiency is controlled to be greater than the corresponding decision-critical point, 0 p S ∆ − ∆ ≥ can be launched, and the price increment can make up for the difference. Investment, at this time, the supply chain will increase its own revenue by providing value-added services, and realize the differentiation of value-added services.
Nature 3: The efficiency of differentiation decreases as the degree of differentiation decreases. When 0.4 θ < , the differentiation efficiency decreases rapidly with the decrease of the degree of differentiation, when 0.4 θ > , the differentiation efficiency decreases slowly as the degree of differentiation decreases. Nature 4: According to the above theorem, when A is certain, the dividing The relation between the degree of the differentiation and the critical point of differentiated inventment is the largest. Therefore, the differentiation efficiency determined by the critical point of differentiated investment is the largest. Therefore, the differentiation efficiency determined by the critical point of differentiated investment is the largest. Therefore, among the ten types of decision-making, when the supply chain two chooses the decentralized decision-making, the value-added service brings the most differentiated efficiency to the supply chain, thereby maximizing the value-added, maximizing the differentiation of value-added services and decentralizing decision-making. It is also the optimal strategy of supply chain one; when θ is certain, the value of ( ) 4 e * is the smallest, so the differentiation efficiency determined by the critical point is also the smallest. Therefore, as long as the supply chain 2 adopts centralized decision-making, no matter which one of the supply chain adopts centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making or partial centralized decision-making, the value-added service brings the least difference efficiency to the supply chain and the minimum value-added gain; When part of the centralized decision-making is made in the supply chain, the value-added services to the supply chain are nearly equal in value, and are between the above two situations. When the degree of product differentiation is certain and relatively large, in the three-level supply chain bertrand game mode, there is an approximate proportional relationship between the values of the three different types of differential investment points, because when the differentiation efficiency is controlled at A within the scope, the differentiation of value-added services can be truly realized, so when the degree of differentiation is certain, the efficiency of differentiation within this range is twice the relationship between the two. The control range of the differentiation efficiency under the other nine decision models can be determined by the control range of the differentiation efficiency of one of the decision models.
Conclusions
In this paper, based on the game problem of price competition between three supply chains, ten different models of decision-making are established, and the reasons for low-price competition between the two supply chains are quantitatively analyzed. It is found that when the products provided by the two supply chains are replaceable. The degree is very large; the differentiation is very small; the customer has little choice for the product, and the price is the only measure for the consumer to purchase the product. The only balanced result of the game between the two supply chains is to choose the price reduction. On the basis of the original model, we added value-added services, increased the differentiation between the two supply chains, established a model for product differentiation in one supply chain, and quantitatively analyzed the differentiation to supply.
The impact of chain-price indicates that the supply chain has improved product prices through product differentiation models based on value-added services, avoiding price vicious competition and reducing consumer price sensitivity.
However, in order to make the product differentiation behavior of value-added services bring value to the supply chain, the differentiation efficiency must be controlled within a certain range; according to the numerical calculation, three different differential investment thresholds are obtained, thus obtaining three kinds of different differentiation efficiency control scope, under each decision condition; in order to obtain new revenue, the supply chain should control the product differentiation efficiency within the corresponding range; so according to the critical point value of the differential investment relationships, to compare the efficiency of differentiation, it is found that when supply chain two chooses decentralized decision-making, the differentiated behavior brings the greatest benefit to the supply chain. When the supply chain chooses centralized decision-making, the differentiated behavior is given to the supply chain. The added value of the benefits is minimal; when the two supply chains select part of the centralized decision-making, the differentiated behavior brings the benefit of the supply chain to the center. At the same time, when the degree of differentiation is certain, the three differentiationn efficiencies have a relationship between two and two. According to the differentiation efficiency of one of the decision forms, the differentiation efficiency of the remaining decision forms can be derived.
The main innovations of this paper are: First, for the Bertrand game between the two three level supply chains, we can provide value-added services to one of the supply chains and raise the price of products, so as to avoid price vicious American Journal of Industrial and Business Management competition. Second: according to each of the ten decision forms, one of the supply chains can identify the most favorable supply chain profit differentiation behavior through differential expression of the investment threshold. Third:
from Figure 2 , we can find that the supply chain with value-added services is dispersed when the degree of alienation is constant.
The shortcomings of this article: This article only studies one of the supply chain to provide value-added services to improve their retail prices, reduce the degree of differentiation, and bring about the increase of income, without studying the role of one supply chain in providing supply chain two by providing value-added services.
